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ABSTRACT
Peer-to-peer file-sharing service providers (P2Ps) allow
Internet users to exchange electronic content, including
music, movies, and other digital works. In Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court
unanimously disarmed such P2Ps by holding that it is
unlawful to distribute programs that induce others to commit
copyright infringement. Evolved technologies, such as dottorrent, allow mass file exchanges between third-party users-an attempt to remove the P2P from the file-sharing equation.
The court in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung,
however, imputed inducement from the search and index
functionality of the P2P’s software, as well as the P2P’s
encouraging behavior. The court in Arista Records LLC v.
Lime Group LLC determined that LimeWire’s entire business
model was founded on inducement. In both Fung and Lime
Group, the P2P's intent was deduced from its outward acts.
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. RapidShare, the court noted that
RapidShare did not provide search and indexing capability
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and actively policed its servers when notified of infringement.
This technological-behavioral standard of inducement
suggests that P2Ps cannot avoid secondary liability under the
guise of removing themselves as the “head” of the filesharing process.
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INTRODUCTION
As technology evolves, the music and movie industries confront
new challenges to the enforcement of their copyrights. The collision
of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing technologies and the copyright
industry was first highlighted by the downfall of the Napster music
sharing platform. 1 Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court developed a
standard for P2P secondary liability based on intent, as evidenced by
outward acts or statements. 2 This standard did not target P2P
1

See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-20 (9th Cir.
2001) (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding Napster liable for contributory copyright
infringement as “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another”)).
2
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919
(2005) (holding that anyone who distributes a “device with the object of promoting

2011]

OFF WITH THE HEAD?

29

technologies as pure technology, but considered how they were
actually used and were intended to be used, as well as whether the
P2P specifically promoted and encouraged infringement. Three recent
district court file-sharing cases emphasize the importance of search
and index functionality as a means of facilitating infringement in
determining secondary liability for copyright infringement. These
decisions evaluate search capability and indexing of popular
copyrighted material under the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster 3 line of cases. In Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v.
Fung, 4 the court termed the defendants’ dot-torrent file technology
“nothing more than old wine in a new bottle” that induced
infringement on a massive scale. 5 In Arista Records LLC v. Lime
Group LLC, 6 the court noted how defendant LimeWire fostered
infringement through search and index capability and did not
“implement any meaningful infringement-reduction strategies.” 7
The court in Perfect 10, Inc. v. RapidShare A.G., 8 on the other
hand, observed that RapidShare’s online storage locations neither
indexed uploaded files nor allowed users to search for files. 9
Moreover, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not provided
evidence that RapidShare's system was designed, disseminated, or
promoted expressly for purposes of facilitating infringement. Despite
its directly housing the potentially infringing files, RapidShare was
not secondarily liable for infringement. 10 From a technological
standpoint, search and indexing functionality unites these three
decisions. When a P2P has actively and intentionally encouraged its
its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties”).
3
Id.
4
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911 (C.D. Cal. Dec.
21, 2009).
5
Id. at *19.
6
Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 2011 WL 1742029 (S.D.N.Y. May
2, 2011).
7
Id. at *21.
8
Perfect 10, Inc. v. RapidShare A.G., No. 09-CV-2596 H (S.D. Cal. May 18,
2010), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/39107375/Perfect-10-vRapidshare---order-denying-preliminary-injunction-0100518.
9
Id. at *11.
10
Id.
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users to upload, find, and aggregate copyrighted material, courts have
found secondary liability under a theory of inducement. Fung and
Lime Group demonstrate that P2Ps cannot avoid secondary liability
by distancing themselves from the infringing activity simply through
the use of technology that decentralizes the infringing file transfers
and even the indexing thereof. 11
To date, courts have found inducement liability when specifically
examining P2P services, rather than services that host content or
other services that fall under the umbrella category of “service
providers” 12 as defined in subsection 512(k)(1)(B) of the DMCA.
Indeed, a number of other service providers have found shelter under
the safe harbor provisions 13 of the DMCA. 14 Policy concerns, as well
11

See also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)
(noting that “willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law (where indeed it may
be enough that the defendant should have known of the direct infringement). . . .”)
(citing Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987); 2 Paul Goldstein,
Copyright § 6.1 p. 6:6 (2d ed. 2003)). Evolved technologies cannot insulate a
service provider from potential contributory liability where the service provider
looks the other way.
12
The term “service provider” under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A), (B) (2006) is defined as:
(A) As used in subsection (a), the term “service provider” means an entity
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the
user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or
received.
(B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term “service
provider” means a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of
facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in subparagraph (A).
13
17 U.S.C. § 512 §§(a)-(d) (2006) establishes four categories of safe harbors
to “‘provide protection from liability for: (1) transitory digital network
communications; (2) system caching; (3) information residing on systems or
networks at the direction of users; and (4) information location tools.’” Perfect 10,
Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Ellison v.
Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004)). To qualify for any of the four safe
harbors, a service provider must meet the requirements of the applicable subsection
as well as those of § 512(i), including whether the service provider “has adopted
and reasonably implemented . . . a policy that provides for the termination in
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service
provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers.” CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1109.
14
Many recent cases have found in favor of defendant service providers under
various safe harbor provisions. These cases do not, however, appear to involve
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as which particular court was hearing the case, have likely
contributed to the outcome of these cases. 15
Following a survey of file-sharing technologies generally and an
overview of inducement liability, this Article examines the role that
search and index functionality and the P2P's conduct have played in
Fung, Lime Group, and RapidShare. Combined, these cases suggest
that a mutually reinforcing technological-behavioral standard has
emerged for P2Ps, whereby search and indexing capacity, among
other technologies, can be imputed as evidence of behavioral intent to
promote infringement. Moreover, this standard appears to be different
than that which courts apply to other service providers. 16
analogous peer-to-peer file-sharing service providers with search and indexing
capabilities. Several cases focus on the notification provisions of the DMCA for
removal of content and the reasonable implementation of a policy for terminating
the accounts of repeat infringers under 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(a). See CCBill, 488
F.3d at 1109. Other courts have explicitly found safe harbor protection for
defendant service providers, primarily under § 512(c). See, e.g., Wolk v. Kodak
Imaging Network, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27541, at *5-8, *24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
17, 2011) (finding that Photobucket had a reasonable policy for removing repeat
infringers under § 512(i)(1)(a) and that Photobucket met the safe harbor provisions
of § 512(c), resulting in a denial of plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction);
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75071, at *22, *26, *29
(C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010) (finding that Google’s treatment of Perfect 10’s “Group
A” and “Group C” infringement notices met the requirements of the safe harbor
under § 512(d) for Google’s Web and Image Search, warranting summary
judgment, but finding that the adequacy Google’s processing of Perfect 10’s
“Group B” notices was in dispute, precluding summary judgment); Viacom Int'l,
Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting
summary judgment for YouTube, which qualified for protection under § 512(c));
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (C.D.
Cal. 2009) (granting summary judgment for Veoh under § 512(c) safe harbor
protection); Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145,
1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (granting summary judgment for Veoh under § 512(c) safe
harbor protection).
15
The UMG v. Veoh and Viacom v. YouTube cases are both on appeal in the
Ninth and Second Circuits, respectively.
16
See YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525-26 (observing that “[Grokster] and its
progeny . . . have little application here. Grokster, Fung, and Lime Group involved
peer-to-peer file-sharing networks which are not covered by the safe harbor
provisions of § 512(c) of the DMCA. The Grokster and Lime Group opinions do
not even mention the DMCA. Fung was an admitted copyright thief whose DMCA
defense under § 512(d) was denied on undisputed evidence of ‘purposeful, culpable

32

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL7:1

I. FILE-SHARING TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP: NAPSTER, GROKSTER
& TORRENT
Peer-to-peer networks are decentralized systems that allow thirdparty users to access files stored on other users’ systems. These
systems do not store files in a central location. 17 Napster, one of the
original file-sharing programs, provided a “‘search index’ that served
as [its] collective directory for the files available on the [Napster]
server at any given time.” 18 Individual users could access files from
other Napster users, many of which contained pirated material subject
to copyright. The Napster court noted how the software allowed
third-party users to locate copyrighted .mp3 files through this search
function and a “hotlist” function. 19 Similar to other peer-to-peer
networks, “the actual files shared never passed through or resided on
the Napster servers.” 20 The files located in third-party “libraries,”
however, were indexed by the Napster software. 21
Post-Napster, technology evolved so that third-party users could
search for files but the service provider did not affirmatively organize
the files: “[u]nlike Napster, there was no central indexing of available
files. Instead, an individual scanning through the Grokster software
would enter a search term and the software itself, through use of a
supernode—or indexing computer—would contact other computers
seeking matching files.” 22 The supernode computer would send the
relevant information for the queried file, such as an IP address where
expression and conduct’ aimed at promoting infringing uses of the [W]eb sites”
(citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *56 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 21, 2009)).
17
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920
(2005).
18
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2001).
19
Id. at 1012. The “hotlist” feature allowed Napster users to track other users’
names from whom they had previously downloaded files. When those “hotlisted”
users logged onto the Napster system, their file libraries were immediately available
for viewing. Again, the .mp3 files themselves were not stored on the Napster
system.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 21, 2009) (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 921).
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the file was located, back to the requesting user. 23 The process
distanced the P2P from third-party infringement, as the “searching
user would then download directly from the relevant computer” and
the transfer would be complete between the two third-party users. 24 A
further variant of this technology involves no supernodes, but
“[i]nstead, the peer computers communicate directly with each other
through the network and requests go directly to other connected
users.” 25
The goal of these new technologies is clear: make the P2P less of
an “engine” and more of a “station,” thereby shifting responsibility
for infringement to third-parties who travel through the station,
instead of the P2P leading them to infringement. The Bit-Torrent 26
technology further distanced the P2P from the peer-to-peer file
sharing process by employing Internet portals that accessed dottorrent files, not the actual files for the copyrighted materials. BitTorrent is similar to prior peer-to-peer file sharing technologies in
that the files reside on third-party user computers, 27 but it differs in
that the user first accesses a dot-torrent file—generally through a
third-party website—and then can use those dot-torrent files to
download content from multiple other users’ computers. 28 Torrent
networks have a unique larger-scale download process that involves
downloading small bits of files from multiple users to assemble a
complete file. 29 Unlike previous peer-to-peer networks, the torrent
process “enables users to identify, locate, and download a copy of the
actual content item referenced by the dot-torrent file.” 30 Though the
23

Id.
Id.
25
Id. (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 922).
26
The files are “referred to as ‘dot-torrent’ files in reference to their file
extension name. The dot-torrent files do not contain the actual content item
searched for; rather, the dot-torrent file contains the data used by the Bit-Torrent
client to retrieve the content through a peer-to-peer transfer.” Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009). The Fung
case also uses the term “bit” to refer to the torrent files or the software client that
manages the uploading and downloading of the torrent files.
27
Id. at *1
28
Id. at *1-2.
29
Id. at *2.
30
Id. at *3.
24
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dot-torrent files are accessible through [third-party] websites, a P2P
necessarily still creates and distributes the software that facilitates the
file transfer process. 31
Standing alone, a torrent client application does not possess the
ability to search other computers for files, because users must “visit a
torrent site for the purpose of locating dot-torrent files containing the
content that they wish to download.” 32 Because third-party user
actions direct searches through third-party Web sites, the torrent
technology was conceived as “headless,” 33 in an effort by the
software client providers to avoid direct involvement and liability in
the file-sharing equation. But court decisions have continued to
frustrate these efforts where the P2P's activities constitute unlawful
inducement of third parties to commit copyright infringement.
II. INDUCEMENT LIABILITY FOR FILE-SHARING COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT
Contributory copyright infringement is a form of secondary
liability34 with “roots in the tort-law concepts of enterprise liability
and imputed intent.” 35 Napster was liable to the extent that it had
reasonable knowledge that infringing files were available on its
system for download and, inter alia, failed to prevent the “viral
distribution” of those copyrighted works. 36 A party contributorily
31

Id.
Id.
33
By using the term “headless,” I do not mean strictly the P2P’s “head” as the
point from which a transmission emanates. Viewed more broadly, “head” refers to
the P2P’s behavior and intent, including the relationship between the technology
the P2P creates and any intent that can be imputed to the P2P from the creation of
that technology. A theoretically “headless” P2P could not be secondarily liable for
inducement under Grokster because there could be no intent.
34
While not formally addressed in this Article, the umbrella of secondary
liability also includes vicarious liability, an extended form of “master-servant”
liability where the defendant has the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activities and also has a direct financial interest in them. Nimmer observes how
vicarious liability originated “in the context of landlords of premises where
infringement takes place.” See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][2] (2010).
35
Perfect 10 v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 794-95 (9th Cir. 2007).
36
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).
32
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infringes when he (1) has knowledge of a third-party’s infringement
and (2) induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct.” 37 It is consequently unlawful to knowingly “engage[] in
personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement.”38 As is
true for any theory of secondary liability, the plaintiff must show
direct infringement of copyrights by third parties. 39
The Supreme Court in Grokster articulated a standard for
contributory liability for services that provide a technology or service
that enables infringement, referred to as “inducement” liability. 40
Under Grokster, inducement to infringe looks at clear evidence of
encouragement to infringe by the distributor of the product or
service. 41 Grokster sent “inducing messages” 42 to its users, such as
distributing an “electronic newsletter containing links to articles
promoting its software's ability to access popular copyrighted music,”
and expressly advertised to former Napster users. 43 These messages
were “evidence of the distributors’ words and deeds going beyond
distribution as such[,] show[ing] a purpose to cause and profit from
third-party acts of copyright infringement.” 44 Inducement liability
cannot be premised on the “mere knowledge of infringing potential or
actual infringing. …The inducement rule, instead, premises liability
Napster was decided on a “site and facilities” theory of contributory liability:
Napster encouraged and materially contributed to direct infringement by providing
the site and facilities for infringement, and indexing was one of the facilities it
provided, indeed the primary one. Id. at 1022.
37
Id. at 1019.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 1004, 1013 n. 2.
40
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930. The courts have created several theories of
contributory copyright infringement, including the provision of a staple article of
commerce that has no substantial non-infringing use per the Supreme Court's
decision in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(holding that the manufacturer of the Betamax video tape recorder was not a
contributory infringer). See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][3] (2010). While courts often mislabel or blur the
distinctions between vicarious and contributory infringement, or different strands of
liability within contributory infringement, this Article focuses on the inducement
prong of contributory liability.
41
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936.
42
Id. at 937.
43
Id. at 925-26.
44
Id. at 941.
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on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct. . . .” 45 A P2P who
distributes a device or software with the intent of promoting its use to
foster infringement (and does so promote its use) may be liable under
a theory of inducement. 46
III. SEARCH AND INDEXING FUNCTIONALITY
P2P software distributors have been unable to eliminate
inducement liability by further developing P2P filing-sharing
technology to mask any direct involvement of the P2P provider in the
infringing activities. Instead, courts continue to examine the P2P’s
intention and the impact of the technology, rather than just the
functional capabilities of the technology itself. 47 Providing search and
indexing functionality, however, does not doom a P2P if it can meet
the requirements for a DMCA safe harbor, beginning with the basic
premise that the P2P is not aware of the infringement. 48
Viewed together, the following three cases show that offering
search and indexing capabilities exposes file-sharing services to
liability when coupled with behavior indicating an intent to promote
infringement.

45

Id. at 936-37.
See id.
47
See Columbia Pictures v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Dec.
21, 2009).
48
One of the safe harbors for service providers enacted with the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(d), provides a safe harbor affirmative
defense to contributory liability resulting from third-party copyright infringement
for “information location tools.” To immunize itself from secondary liability under
the safe harbor, a service provider must satisfy three separate prongs (in addition to
the general requirements under subsection 512(i) . The party “[1] does not know . . .
or have reason to know . . . of infringing activities, or removes infringing materials
upon receipt of such knowledge; and [2] does not profit from infringement where it
has the power to control the infringement . . . ; and [3] upon receiving notice . . .
from the copyright holder, removes the infringing material . . . .” Fung, 2009 WL
6355911, at *16. This safe harbor for “information location tools” applies to
“copyright infringement resulting from the use of information location tools by
service providers, which include directories, indexes, references, pointers and
hypertext links.” See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d
1146, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
46

2011]

OFF WITH THE HEAD?

37

A. Columbia Pictures v. Fung: Intent to Induce
Defendant Gary Fung operated several websites 49 that allowed
users to download copyrighted material through a torrent structure. 50
Users accessed movies, television shows, sound recordings, software
programs, video games, and other content for free by connecting with
other users offering these files. 51 The Fung sites contained several
features that organized the content for third-party users, including
“Top Searches,” “Top 20 Movies,” and “Top 20 Most Downloaded
Torrents.” 52 Every file in the “Top Searches” category was
copyrighted, and Plaintiffs’ expert further maintained that 95 percent
of total downloads involved copyrighted material. 53 Furthermore,
Fung’s sites contained headers with the term “warez,” 54 and actively
promoted copyright infringement through slogans and commentary in
discussion forums on his websites. 55
Through the lens of Grokster inducement liability, the court
characterized Fung’s aggregation of infringing content into
“browseable categories” containing “further information about the
works contained in the [torrent] files” as “disseminated messages
designed to stimulate inducement.”56 Fung maintained that his system
was “headless,” entirely driven by third-party user activity. 57 The
court disagreed, noting that Fung actively created the framework for
49

The Fung sites included: www.isohunt.com, www.torrentbox.com,
www.podtropolis.com, and www.ed2k-it.com.
50
The court explained that “Bit-Torrent technology relies on a variety of
mechanisms in order to accomplish the ultimate downloading of a given file,
including: (1) a software application that users download, which is commonly
referred to as a ‘client application’; (2) websites, also known as ‘torrent sites,’
which allow users to select ‘dot-torrent’ files that they wish to download; and (3)
servers, also known as ‘trackers,’ that manage the download process. The client
applications and trackers work together through the use of ‘Bit-Torrent protocol’
which standardizes the client-client and client-tracker communications.” Columbia
Pictures v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
The term “warez” refers to pirated content.
55
Id. at *5, *12.
56
Id. at *11.
57
Id.
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the infringing activity by designing the websites, including “a feature
that collects users’ most commonly searched-for titles[,] . . . and
never remov[ing] these lists.” 58 Fung’s design was probative of his
“knowledge of ongoing infringement and failure to prevent such
infringement.” 59 Posting messages in discussion forums that provided
tips on how to search for certain copyrighted material, allowing
“moderators” or “admins” to review the forums and assist third-party
user queries, and commenting on third-party user aggregation lists of
copyrighted works was indicative of an active role in encouraging
infringement. 60
The court also noted that Fung employed “spider” programs
(tracking software) that found and retrieved copies of dot-torrent
files. 61 Together, these factors—indexing material, allowing users to
search, advertising content, commenting on content, and offering a
“spider” to seek out files—meant Fung had merely “improved the
functioning of his websites with respect to infringing uses.” 62
The Fung court construed search and index functionality, along
with other contextual behavior mentioned above, as the inducing
“message” that encouraged third-party infringement of copyrights. As
such, Fung’s network was not a headless “proprietary” network that
merely allowed users to download files from each other’s computers,
but instead improved upon previous technologies to allow faster
download of infringing materials. 63 The court weighed the provision
of search and index capacity as strong evidence of inducement, a
factor which, along with other behavioral evidence, also had a
significant impact on the courts' determination of inducement liability
in the Lime Group and RapidShare cases.
B. Arista Records v. Lime Group: Intent to Induce
LimeWire (“LW”) is a peer-to-peer file-sharing program that

58

Id.
Id.
60
Id. at *12-13.
61
Id. at *14.
62
Id.
63
Id. at *19.
59
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allows users to download and share digital files. 64 Unlike the torrent
technology in Fung, the LW software locates files on a single
network where users can search for files on other computers. 65 Once
a file is located, the LW client transfers a digital copy from the source
computer to the recipient’s computer. 66 Several record companies
sued LW for copyright infringement, arguing that LW users
employed the software to obtain and share unauthorized copies of the
companies’ sound recordings, and that LW facilitated this
infringement by distributing and maintaining LW software. 67
In addition to the “inducing message” framework for secondary
liability, Grokster also supplied other behavioral measures of proving
intent to induce infringement. 68 The Lime Group court divided these
factors into five categories: (1) awareness of substantial infringement
by users; (2) efforts to attract infringing users; (3) efforts to assist
users to commit infringement; (4) dependence on infringing use for
the success of its business; and (5) failure to mitigate infringing
activities. 69 Taken together, the court found “overwhelming
evidence” that LW fostered infringement. 70
First, LW was aware of substantial infringement by LW users
through LW’s effort to convert LW users who were sharing
unauthorized digital music recordings into customers of LW’s online
music store. 71 LW’s “Conversion Plan” acknowledged that “(1) 25%
of LW’s users were ‘hardcore pirates’; (2) 25% of users were
‘morally persuadable’; (3) 20% of users were legally aware; and (4)
30% of users were ‘samplers and convenience users.’” 72 The
Conversion Plan was supposed to introduce features that would block
infringing uses and transition users to the online store, but those

64

Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 2011 WL 1742029, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at *15 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913, 938-39 (2005)).
69
Arista Records, 2011 WL 1742029 at *16.
70
Id.
71
Id. at *17.
72
Id.
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features were never implemented. 73 Numerous emails from LW
users, as well as a collection of articles kept by LW employees
entitled “Knowledge of Infringement” clearly established LW’s
knowledge. 74
Second, LW made an effort to attract infringing users who
formerly found files using the Napster software. 75 LW contemplated
using college campus advertising to leverage Napster’s ban and
strategically placed LW website advertisements under certain Google
search queries, including “napster mp3” and “napster download,”
among others. 76
Third, LW optimized the software client’s features to enable
third-party copyright infringement. Similar to Fung, LW created
search functionality that allowed users to browse by genre, including
“Classic Rock” and “Top 40.” 77 LW employees tested the search
functionality of the LW client using Sinead O’Connor’s copyrighted
song “Nothing Compares 2 U,” and actively assisted users who
requested technical assistance with the LW client’s functionality. 78
Fourth, LW depended on infringing use for commercial success. 79
LW’s software client was widely available online for free download,
and LW depended on the selling of advertising, thereby tying revenue
to the size of its user base. 80 The free LW client also served as a
platform to introduce users to LW’s other offerings, including LW
Pro, a premium service, and the LW online store. The court
concluded that LW’s “commercial success . . . is derived largely from
the high-volume use of LW, most of which is infringing.” 81
Finally, LW failed to mitigate the infringing activities.82
Numerous available technological barriers and design choices to
73

Id. at *17, *20.
Id. at *17.
75
Id.
76
Id. at *17-18.
77
Id. at *18.
78
Id.
79
Plaintiff’s expert conducted a random sample of 1,800 files requested for
download for free distribution and found that 93% were protected by copyright or
highly likely to be protected. Id. at *3.
80
Id. at *19.
81
Id.
82
Id. at *20.
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reduce infringement could have been implemented, including: hashbased filtering, 83 acoustic fingerprinting, 84 and user education. 85
Both the Fung and Lime Group courts looked at the technology
and the behavior of the P2P to find evidence of intent to promote
infringement. The Lime Group court also examined commercial
factors. Both Fung and LW offered search and index functionality to
their users, and both provided direct assistance and support. Grokster
very clearly provides that to be liable for inducement, a P2P must
have an intent to induce infringement, as well as a technology used to
infringe. This contrasts with the decision in Sony, 86 where there was
no evidence of an actual intent to induce and the Court held that such
an intent could not be induced from the technology itself unless there
were no substantial non-infringing uses. Grokster established that the
provider of a technology used to infringe can be liable even if that
technology has substantial non-infringing uses (does not meet the
Sony standard) where evidence of intent to induce infringement can
actually be shown. In Grokster, Fung, and Lime Group, the courts
looked to the totality of the evidence to find an intent to induce.
C. Perfect 10 v. RapidShare: Technological-Behavioral Standard
RapidShare is a file-hosting program that allows users to store
files on its servers and to “share” the URLs for files so stored, rather
than a P2P service. 87 RapidShare’s servers “automatically generate a
83

Hash-based filtering “utilizes a digital file’s ‘hash,’ which is a numeric
representation of a file based on a complex algorithm, to identify and block
infringing files.” Id. at *30 n.28.
84
Acoustic fingerprinting “can monitor the uploading or downloading of
digital files. . . . If the acoustic fingerprint of a particular file matches a copyrightprotected files present in the existing database, the transfer of that file may be
blocked.” Id. at *30 n.30.
85
Id. at *20.
86
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439
(1984) (“Sony certainly does not ‘intentionally [induce]’ its customers to make
infringing uses of respondents' copyrights, nor does it supply its products to
identified individuals known by it to be engaging in continuing infringement of
respondents' copyrights”) (citing Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 885
(1982)).
87
Perfect 10, Inc. v. RapidShare, No. 09-CV-2596 H, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 18,
2010).
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unique download link (a URL) for each uploaded file and send that
link to the user who uploaded the file.” 88 The file itself remains on
RapidShare’s servers, but once the user receives the link, “she can
email the link to friends, post it on her Web site for others to access,
or keep it confidential, among other potential uses.” 89 Perfect 10
(P10), whose business involves the creation and sale of adult
entertainment photos, videos, and other media, claimed direct
infringement by third parties, that P10 owned the copyrights to some
of the works at issue, and that those works were available for
download from RapidShare’s servers. 90
The court’s order denied P10’s motion for a preliminary
injunction, finding that P10 did not meets its burden for showing a
likelihood of success on the merits. 91 The court observed how
RapidShare’s website “did not index user materials and did not allow
users to search for specific files.” 92 Comparing RapidShare’s
contribution to infringement to prior cases finding liability, the court
noted that “the public cannot enter rapidshare.com and browse
through a catalog for desired materials,” nor could a RapidShare user
“find a specific song from a peer’s library because RapidShare does
not index its files.” 93 The RapidShare service as a means of sharing
files was headless, as “all communication regarding the location of
files [was] user driven.” 94 RapidShare did not provide an “integrated
service” allowing for search and download that might be used to
impute intent on the part of RapidShare. 95
Furthermore, from a behavioral standpoint, RapidShare took
measures to prevent further damage to the copyright owners by
locating and removing infringing materials. 96 “[T]here [were]
substantial lawful uses” of RapidShare’s servers, which “provided
users with a secure location to store and access files from anywhere
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Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *3.
90
Id. at *8.
91
Id. at *4, *11.
92
Id.
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Id. at *6.
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Id. at *8.
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Id. at *9
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that there is Internet access.” 97 In other words, RapidShare’s server
was essentially an unfiltered repository because it had no itemized
and searchable index. 98 This technology did not expose RapidShare
to inducement liability because there was no evidence of intent to
induce infringement and RapidShare has many legitimate uses.
RapidShare simply unlocked the online storage space for individual
users to upload and store files. There was no advertising targeted to
known infringers, no indexing, and no ability to search for files. 99
Here again, the court’s emphasis on search and indexing
capability was an important factor in the contributory liability
analysis under the Napster “site and facilities” framework. 100
IV. SYNTHESIS: NO SUCH THING AS HEADLESS
Fung’s provision of search and index functionality in his software
client and his administration of his websites and forums provided a
head that affirmatively invited infringing use of available copyrighted
material by third parties. LW created search and index capability and
was not only aware of infringement but designed a business model
around it, relying on infringing use to gain commercial success. In
contrast, RapidShare housed potentially infringing content on its own
servers but provided no search or index capability, did not actively
encourage any third-party file-sharing through its software or server,
and deleted infringing material upon receipt of a DMCA notice from
copyright holders. RapidShare, in essence, was a disconnected
97

Id. at *11.
There are, however, dozens if not hundreds of external services that provide
indexing for RapidShare.
99
The YouTube court’s discussion of Grokster is telling: “The Grokster model
does not comport with that of a service provider who furnishes a platform on which
its users post and access all sorts of materials as they wish, while the provider is
unaware of its content . . . and removes identified material when [it] learns [the
content] infringes.” Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). The court also noted that an email from the plaintiff saying “the
difference between YouTube’s behavior and Grokster’s is staggering.” Id. Both of
these observations seem to apply to RapidShare, in contradistinction to Fung and
Lime Group.
100
RapidShare, No. 09-CV-2596 H, at *8 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)).
98
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storage depot.
What these three cases have in common is the courts’ emphasis
on the provision of search and indexing functionality, presumably on
the theory that if a service does not provide users with a means to
locate infringing material, as well as upload it, the service must not
have been designed specifically to promote illegal file sharing. As
directed by Grokster, each of the three courts looked toward actions
and behavior of the P2P for evidence of intent to foster infringement,
analyzing whether the provision of the technology, joined with such
behavior, could be analogized to sending inducing messages to
encourage the infringement. Even where the court found that
RapidShare’s storage technology was not designed to facilitate thirdparty infringement, the court still examined RapidShare’s behavioral
response. The RapidShare service allowed users to upload infringing
files (it did not filter the files), but did not index the files, nor allow
users to search for files. Although third parties found ways to use the
RapidShare e-mailed hyperlinks to infringe, the court weighed
RapidShare’s behavior, especially its active removal of P10’s
copyrighted files, in RapidShare’s favor.
Under the technological-behavioral standard applied by the
courts, a head is still necessary, to respond to third-party infringement
and reduce the P2P’s potential exposure to secondary liability. 101
CONCLUSION
Despite the evolution of decentralized file-sharing technologies,
the Fung court construed search and indexing functionality as the
equivalent of sending a message encouraging third-party users to
infringe (along with Fung’s literal inducement through his words and
actions). As demonstrated by the extensive list of behavioral and
business factors in Lime Group, courts will look at the totality of the
101

This duty to respond should not be construed as a duty to monitor: the
“DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright
infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately
documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright. We decline to
shift a substantial burden from the copyright owner to the provider . . . .” Viacom
Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007)).
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defendant’s actions. Ultimately, the courts in Fung and Lime Group
determined that search and indexing capability, along with
affirmative marketing, profit from infringement, and user support
features, created a “head” that sent an inducing message to third-party
users to infringe. The RapidShare court tacitly acknowledged that a
head can never truly be absent: RapidShare’s removal of the
infringing files, once receiving notice of third-party infringement,
reduced potential liability. Though inducement liability under
Grokster technically requires more than just knowledge of
infringement or potential for infringement, RapidShare suggests a
higher level of care once P2Ps are notified of copyright
infringement. 102 A P2P can never completely remove itself from the
file-sharing process; remedying specific known illegal uses may
counteract allegations of inducing message through silence. The idea
of an evolved, headless P2P, immune from secondary liability for the
infringement of its users, is a fiction that has not survived judicial
scrutiny.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Inducement liability under Grokster may be found where the
defendant encourages infringement through the provision of
search and indexing technology that provides access to infringing
material, as well as through other behavioral factors indicating an
intent to induce infringement.



Providing search and index capacity that facilitates finding and
access to infringing materials may be treated as significant
evidence of intent to induce; however, purely behavioral factors
102

An interesting question is when knowledge becomes intent – if RapidShare
did not specifically design the service to be infringing but third parties started using
it that way, and RapidShare knew of that use and also realized it benefited from the
infringement but did not take simple measures to discourage it, should RapidShare
be liable, as raised by Mary Rasenberger. This is essentially the focus of Viacom
Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). While the service
apparently was not originally designed to facilitate infringement, the founders
intentionally kept infringing content up (even specific infringing content that they
had identified) because they realized the infringing content was driving traffic to
the YouTube site and increasing its value.
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will also affect a court's determination of inducement.


Even if valid potential uses for the technology exist, P2Ps should
still take affirmative steps to mitigate illegal infringement,
including removing infringing files about which they have been
notified.



A possible DMCA affirmative defense exists for websites with
search and index functionality, provided the P2P meets the
requirements set out in the safe harbor provisions of 17 U.S.C. §
512.

